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Abstract -International Information Systems, often of critical
importance for the operations of the multinational enterprise,
are poorly researches and there is a dearth of theoretical
frameworks for analysing them. This paper summarises the
evolution of an IIS as it follows its organisation’s global
business development. Using a Case History method in the
Grounded Theory tradition the paper derives a number of key
variables and develops their relationship in an effort to
establish some theoretical foundations for such systems. The
findings support the notion that international information
systems should follow the global business strategy of the
multi-national enterprise they support. Failure of the IIS to
adapt to the organisation’s strategy changes sets up a field of
antagonistic forces, in which business resistance summarily
defeated all attempts to install a standard global information
system. The key variables from both the business and
information technology domain interact in this force field in a
cyclical manner. The notion of causal networks is used to
depict the migration through these cycles

INTRODUCTION
Academic research into international information systems
(IIS), i.e. information systems for use in multinational
enterprises (MNEs), is sparse [10], [3] and little of even the
current research is of direct help to systems building
practitioners, who have come to regard IIS as difficult and
risky [9]. Reference [11] shows that only 8% of some 80
European firms had completed IIS development satisfactorily.
This paper, building on research reported earlier [14],
investigates further the driving forces for the development of
an IIS. Following a summary literature review and a brief
discussion of the research method employed the main part of
the paper is the description of the further analysis and
findings from a case history. Finally, conclusions are drawn
and an outline of the further research is presented.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As set out in more detail in literature reviews and position
papers elsewhere ([8] covers the early research, [20] gives a
very exhaustive overview, and [13] brings it more up-to-date),
past research into international information systems is

sporadic and spread over a wide array of topics. Because of
the availability of these position papers and also because
grounded theory principles discourage the solidification of
a-priori positions, only an illustrative summary of the
literature is given in this paper. TABLE 1 on the next page
sets this out - the shading reflects ‘light’, ‘medium’ or
‘intensive’ coverage of the issues. Only in the last few
years have researchers begun to direct their attention onto
the field of critical factors for the design and development of
IIS.
RESEARCH M ETHODOLOGY
The dearth of IIS research makes qualitative, theory building
methods an appropriate choice. Such methods are well
established in organisational research and are becoming
accepted in information systems research too ([2], [4], [5],
[18], [22], [24]). In Sociology, Glaser & Strauss [6] and [7]
had already developed a specific inductive method [25]
which they termed the ‘Grounded Theory’ (GT) approach,
where theory is left to ‘emerge’ from the data - in which it is
‘grounded’. Turner [21] was one of the first to apply the GT
approach to management studies. Orlikowski [17], [19] has
pioneered GT in Information System (IS) Research. Yoong
[23] and Atkinson [1] are recent studies. Grounded Theory
principles applied to case analysis were chosen as the
method employed in this research project. The following
section gives a - highly abridged - description of the salient
facts in mostly tabular format of the case history in question.
Reference [14] provides a more detailed description of the
case.
CASE HISTORY: A USTRALASIAN FOOD PRODUCERS’ CO-OP
Business background
The Australasian Food Producers’ Co-op (later on also
referred to as the ‘Co-op’) with some $4.5bn1 revenue is one
of the largest marketing authorities for land-based industries
in the world.
1

) All names within the enterprise have been changed. All figures are
in US Dollars
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TABLE 1 . RESEARCH COVERAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS DOMAIN :
Indications of LIGHT, MEDIUM OR INTENSIVE coverage of the topic in the literature

Layer

Technology

Scope and
objectives
Business
processes
model
Information
systems
(design) model
Technology
model

MEDIUM

Applications

Implementation &
Social Issues
MEDIUM

Governmental
Issues
MEDIUM

MEDIUM

LIGHT

INTENSIVE

MEDIUM

Structured into 9 regional holding companies, it has a
presence in 135 offices in 40 countries.
Prior to the mid-1970s Australasia exported the vast majority
of its produce to the United Kingdom, who, under
Commonwealth rules, used to accept it all.
Once the UK had joined the European Union, however, they
had to give free access to all other EU members, and cut the
Co-op’s quota severely. Australasia had to develop new
markets. A number of subsidiary offices was set up rapidly
and agencies were nominated in the US and Canada. This
policy of local autonomy was successful. Within a decade
the Co-op had built a presence in more than thirty countries
and had managed, throughout, to secure a satisfactory return
for the all their primary producers.
At the onset of the 90s, however, competition for the Cop-op
had become increasingly global. With the emergence of
global brands (such as Coca Cola, McDonalds, etc.); the Coop needed to develop global brands themselves and had to
have sufficient command (and control) to mount
synchronised international marketing and logistics
operations. With the arrival of a new Chief Executive Officer
in 1992 the Co-op began a concerted campaign to shift
authority and control back to head-office, within a vision of
balanced central control and local flexibility. Part of this new
policy was a critical look at the role of information systems
throughout the Co-op’s operations.
The IS Landscape in 1992
During the ‘global’ phase, the Co-op had built up a sizeable
IS department with a mainframe operation at the head-office,
linking up with all the main subsidiary offices and ProdCos
throughout the country. Foreign activities were few and
hardly needed computer support. The forced expansion drive
2

Management
Issues
MEDIUM

) After Lehmann (1997), from a framework suggested by Zachmann (1987)

LIGHT

INTENSIVE

in the 80’s, however, lead to an increased need by local
operations to be supported with information systems. By
1992 a number of regional offices had bought computers and
software to suit their own, individual requirements. IBM
(3090, S/36 and AS/400), Digital, Data General, HewlettPackard, Sun were the main hardware platforms, supporting
regional networks between 80 terminals (Japan) and 500 (at
HQ), multiple central machines (UK/Europe) and
sophisticated regional networks (South America). Where
there was no central mainframe/minicomputer, local-area PC
networks had sprung up in more than a dozen countries
around the globe.
The Global Information Systems Project
Against this background of a proliferation of uncoordinated
local systems on the one hand and a declared policy of more
control from the Co-op’s centre on the other, the Co-op’s IS
Department, in April 1992 took the initiative to establish a
global “Framework for Information Systems”, binding for all
of the Co-op’s 135 offices in 35 countries. Subsequently, late
in 1992, the ‘Food Information Systems Technology’ (FIST)
project was created by the IS Department to implement this
‘Framework’s’ in three stages:
•

Firstly, to develop a ‘prototype’ system with a
representative site;

•

Second, implementation of the prototype in a small
number of ‘pilot’ sites; and finally,

Following successful completion of this, a synchronised
‘roll-out’ of the ‘global system’ into all the regions and
offices would form the last stage. Estimated completion
dates for the three stages were late 1993, early 1995 and mid
1996 respectively.
TABLE 2 below sets out an overview of the project.

TABLE 2.:
PROJECT TIMELINE: CO-OP’S FIST PROJECT

Time
Late-1992

Early-1993
Mid-1993

Late-1993
Early-1994

Late-1994

Early 1995

Mid 1995

Late 1995

Early 1996
Mid 1996
Late 1996

Early 1997

Project Activity
North America Region (NAR) reviews its ageing IBM S/34. NA chosen as ‘prototype’ site.
South East Asia Region (SEAR) needs to upgrade their fragmented PC-based installation to
cope with rapid regional growth.
Both sites chosen as pilot sites for FIST;
FIST Budget (for full global implementation) is set at US$ 35m
‘Benchmark’ (concept prototype) for NAR developed by the FIST team at the Co-op’s HQ.
‘Benchmark’ comparison between NAR and SEAR finds a 90-95% match. SEAR points out it
is in different markets with different products; refuses to accept ‘Benchmark’ and opts out of
the pilot.
FIST issues a global Request for Proposal (RFP) based on NAR ‘Benchmark’. Selection of
global technology to be completed by early-1994, full pilot implemented by mid-1994.
RFP’s evaluated and global standard technology selected, based on ORACLE on an HP
platform. Applications software to come from ORACLE and DATALOGIX (a small North
America software house and ORACLE partner). No communications vendors or support
organisations were selected;
NAR pilot deadline extended to late-1994.
NAR pilot deadline extended to mid-1995;
‘Benchmark’ comparison extended to European Region (ER) finds aother 90-95% match; ER
rejects the finding, citing divergence in markets, products as well as large intra-regional
diversity; ER refusues to accept FIST;
ORACLE insists to support the NAR pilot from its Australasian office (not from its North
America base).
FIST team enlist support of the Co-op’s CEO, who issues a strong directive to all regions to
accept FIST;
FIST Project Costs at US$ 5m
ORACLE begin to negotiate with DATLOGIX to acquire their software; all modification work
in FIST stops;
NAR pilot deadline extended to early-1996;
Co-op opens new office in Dubai;
NAR opts out of the pilot project and pursues interim solution before it will decide to
implement FIST;
FIST team select Dubai as the new representative pilot site for the global standard
information system; FIST begin to develop a new ‘global prototype’ for Dubai at HQ (there
are insufficient IS resources in Dubai);
Dubai ‘global prototype’ deadline is early-1996;
Dubai pilot/prototype deadline is extended to late-1996;
Co-op CEO commissions an international consulting firm to carry out a management audit of
the FIST project.
Dubai pilot/prototype deadline is extended to early-1996;
Consultants report to CEO: “FIST overly ambitious, unachievable within timeframe, benefits
doubtful”;
Dubai pilot/prototype is reduced in scope (Standard Financials only) and goes live;
Management of FIST re-assigned;
Scope of FIST changed to develop a global information systems plan;
Total Project Cost of FIST: US$ 8m.

FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE
The analysis of the case is based on interviews with key
management and staff of the Co-op in Australasia, North
America and Europe. Furthermore, a selection of internal
documents (memos, minutes and reports) was used to
underpin and extend the information gathered in the
interviews. Coding the interview transcripts (some 400 pages)
and the supporting documentation (93 documents, combined
of some 2500 pages) yielded an initial set of 133 basic,
‘substantive’ categories in the terminology of Glaser &
Strauss [7]. These were then conceptualised, condensed and
affiliated into 27 major categories. From those, 13 ‘core’
categories were developed.
In terms of [7], theory is a process in which ‘categories’ – the
key influence factors - act upon each other in the form of
‘relations’. Categories are directly grounded in observed fact,
whereas ‘relations’ are conceptualised by inference from the
unfolding story in order to bring to it a temporal,
correlational; or even causal order. The core categories
found in the Co-op case fall into two domains, depending on
whether the category stems from the business or information
technology arena. In both domains the factors contributed to
considerable dynamics in the interplay between categories.
The following paragraphs set out a summary of the core
categories and their relationships. For details see [14].
The business dynamics categories are the main influence
over the Co-op’s position vis-à-vis information technology
and the international information system. The Nature of the
Business, is the most fundamental category. Its structural
uniqueness determines the essential characteristics of the
Global Business Strategy. Similarly, the particulars of its
evolution have caused this strategy to change in a distinct
Migration of Global Strategy. All three of these factors
combine to form a Tradition of Autonomy among the Co-op’s
local offices and regions. Although assisted by other
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Whilst most of the categories affect each other in a number
of ways, the two dynamics domains seem to set up a force
field (in the sense of [15]), as an arena for the interactions
between the business and information technology interests.
Figure 1 illustrates this. The force field is dominated by the
interplay of four key categories: Global Standard IS Design
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Four ‘conditioning’ factors shape the character of the three
‘effector’ categories in the information technology group.
The most fundamental conditioner is the category of
Conceptual Capability to conceptualise and think through
thorny issues. The lack (or low level) of it has had a
dampening effect on the other conditioning categories, but
most of all on Analysis, the repository of the (mostly
erroneous) paradigms used in the system building activity.
These were complemented by the (often low) quality of the
Information Systems Professional Skills brought to bear and
the evidence of a pronounced inadequacy to comprehend
international issues, summarised in the Domestic Mindset
category. In concert they affect most of all the standardised,
centrist nature of the international system, brought together
in the Global Standard IS Design category. This is the main
interface with the business domain. The two other effectors
are the fact that the whole project is an IS Initiative and the
tendency to resort to political power-play, termed IS by
Force.
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influences, this Tradition of Autonomy is the main shaper of
an attitude of Rejection of the Global Information System,
which in itself is then a major influence in the development
of the FIST project. The other information technology
related category is a Lack of IT Experience in information
technology matters at the Co-op’s headquarters. The
political element of the Co-op’s nature of business is a
partial reason for this. In turn, the Co-op’s naivety in
information technology at the centre reinforces the Tradition
of Local Autonomy, this time with respect to information
systems.
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Figure 1. Force Field of Business and IT Dynamics: Interplay of main categories and relations
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is a causal factor in the Rejection of the Global System, which
in turn affects IS Initiative and IS by Force.
So far, categories have been viewed as static elements, as
‘hidden’ properties of the story. However, theory links
categories together and shows the relationships between
them. At this stage, the way in which categories influence
each other in a cause-and-effect manner needs to be
investigated.

(to achieve a ‘transnational’ Global Business Strategy for the
Co-op) as a return to full central control, as befitting the
‘global’ stance the Co-op had taken in the beginning. The
regional business people saw this as an attempt to roll back
their autonomy – and predictably acted against this notion.
In doing so, and because they suspected the CEO (as the
‘head’ of the central forces) as covertly backing this
regressive move, they included resistance against the
‘transnational’ thrust together with the Rejection of the
Global Information System. Depicted as vectors, the
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altogether. Figure 2 depicts the essential dynamics of
the force field.
respective strategic thrusts of the actors are shown in Figure
3.
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Figure 2. Force Field, demonstrating the clash between Information
Technology and Business antagonists

The roots of the confrontation, the inappropriateness of the
Global IS Design, however, has itself a deeper cause.
The character of the system as an unbending standard design
for all, without regard for differences in size, business culture,
markets or strategies is an outcome of the Information
Technology people’s interpretation of the wishes of the CEO.
They translated the thrust for increased global co-ordination

Regional management puts in a show of resistance against
the – suspected – increase in central control and makes its
own case of increased regional and local independence from
head office. The central strategic vision, however, is
pointed towards more regional autonomy – albeit balanced
by an equal amount of central control over global concerns
(e.g. branding, global product strategies, etc). The
Information Technology people misunderstand both and
push strongly for a policy of control, exerted by standard
information systems, implemented on standard technology
platforms and following standardised routine.
In the end, the Information Technology strategic thrust is
nearly diametrically opposed to the – resultant – direction of
where the business wants to go. The resulting extreme misalignment between business and information technology
strategies is the main factor in establishing the force field
and the major determinant of the strength of the adversarial
interactions between the antagonists.
Furthermore, the interactions in the force field were to take
on a cyclical character.
The initial refusal of the business to accept or implement the
global system in turn lead to an intensification of the IS

Initiative category. This was especially the case after the
initial attempts to incorporate business objections into the
Global IS Design had floundered (for reasons of deficient
‘Systems Building Capacity’, which is the collective term for
the ‘conditioner’ categories in the Information Technology
domain).
The other reaction to the business side’s lack of co-operation
was to attempt to introduce the IS by Force, using political
power play to achieve user acceptance and facilitate
implementation of the global system.
The three categories, namely Rejection of the Global System,
IS Initiative and IS by Force subsequently get locked in a
cause-effect loop (as defined by Miles & Huberman, 1994):
•
Rejection in turn intensified the isolation of
the IS people (expressed in the IS Initiative
category) and lead them to try and
•
implement the IS by Force, attempting to
achieve by political means what they could not do
by consensus and rational co-operation with the
business people.
•
These political power plays were met with
increased Rejection of the Global Information
System, which then started the cycle of
rejection/isolation/politics all over again.
The triangular interaction between the categories takes the
form of a set of cyclical moves (shown in Figure 4). The case
history shows a number of iterations through this circle.
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The Co-op’s case yielded a rich set of categories and
relations, of a relevant and detailed nature so as to
encourage the beginnings of the formulation of a
substantive theory of the factors that affect and the shape
and the process of building an international information
systems. This vindicates the use of cases and the grounded
theory method as a vehicle to elicit insights into this
complex field.
The case of the Co-op’s attempt to generate an international
information system indicates the importance of strategy
alignment between the multi-national firm and its information
technology function in terms of the Global Business
Strategy followed by the enterprise. The case further
showed that the requirements for professionalism and indepth understanding of international issues are essential for
even starting an international information systems project.
Absence of any of these ingredients seems conducive to
establishing an environment for political interaction in a
‘force field’, which is unproductive and does not further the
implementation and acceptance of the international
information systems. Engaging in political battles,
especially, detracts from the objectives of the exercise and
ultimately results in the demise of the project altogether.
In order to start formulating a more detailed – and verifiable theory, however, a number of the categories need more
detail before they. are ‘saturated’ in terms of the grounded
theory methodology. ‘Theoretical sampling’ for similar or
contrasting cases needs now to occur to make this possible.
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